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ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDEPENDENCY
Polinpapilinbo F. Katina, Ph.D. Student., Old Dominion University
C. Ariel Pinto, Ph.D., Old Dominion University

Abstract
Developing effective protection, m1ttgation, and
recovery measures for critical infrastructure (CI)
systems is paramount in the wake of increasing natural
and manmade hazards, risks, and threats. Influencing
protection, rescue, and recovery measures are
interplays
(i.e.,
interdependencies)
among
infrastructure
systems.
Understanding
interdependencies plays an essential role in minimizing
and reducing cascading failures among complex
interdependent infrastructure systems. This paper
asserts that deployment of protection, mitigation, and
recovery solutions can have little effect on
infrastructure management if infrastructure operators
and policymakers have partial understanding of
infrastructure interdependencies.
Using narrative
research, authors illustrate that effective coordination
and response for protection, mitigation, and recovery
requires understanding complex interdependencies
among infrastructures. Themes commonly associated
with CI protection are examined from an
interdependency perspective. Using the healthcare
sector as an example, authors discuss potential
complexities and interdependencies in sustaining
public health. This paper concludes with a need for
methodological approaches capable of holistically
analyzing infrastructure systems.

Stat. 40 l ). Because the United States of America and
other well-developed nations heavily depend on
products, goods, and services that such infrastructure
systems provide, there has been an unprecedented need
to protect such Cls. What do such systems include?
How did they come to be critical? In addition, what are
we doing about managing them? A simple literature
review reveals that there is marginal consensus on what
constitutes Cls. For example, Bush (2003), Thissen
and Herder (2003), and the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, DHS, (2006) view CI differently.
As the demand for provisions (products, goods,
and services) has increased, so has inside and outside
influence that disrupt normal operations of the
infrastructure system activities and processes rendering
such systems inoperable. The inoperability of CI is
linked to several societal changes that have occurred in
th
the late 20 and 21 st century. For example, Thissen
and Herder (2003) stipulate that technological
advancement, rapid institutional changes, increasing
complexity,
trans-boundary
dependencies,
and
increasing demand for quality services coupled with
increasing natural threats present a grave challenge for
policymakers, engineers, and scientist in sustaining
societal operations. The need for understanding of
infrastructure relationships is especially essential in CI
because infrastructure systems do not operate in
isolation.
The intricate interdependencies among
infrastructures have already illustrated that there is a
need for a shift in the infrastructure management
paradigm. For example, a single blackout in Germany
on November 4, 2006 caused loss of power for millions
in France, Italy, Spain, and Austria. Cascading
unintended electric failure resulted
in transport
systems (i.e., trains, traffic signals) delays and
disruptions of other interconnected operations (UCTE,
2006)
It is from this perspective that this paper espouses
that understanding tl1e relationship among elements,
components, and infrastructure systems is an essential
step in improving infrastructure designs, protection,
and security measures . Using a narrative research
approach (Patton, 2002), authors explore potential
interrelationships among infrastructure systems using
themes associated with CI research. To achieve this
objective, this paper is divided into several sections.
First, authors provide the reasoning behind the need for
dependable
infrastructure
systems.
Second,

Keywords: Critical infrastructure, critical healthcare
infrastructure, interdependencies, healthcare, system
Introduction
In the 21 st century, the well-being of the public is
intrinsically intertwined with certain infrastructures and
key asset provisions. The destruction of key assets can
cause large-scale property damages, human injury and/
or death. Furthermore, the destruction of key assets
can profoundly damage national prestige and
confidence (Bush, 2003). Hence, such infrastructures
are vital to national security, national economic
security, and national public health or safety.
Collectively known as critical infrastructures (CI), such
"systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so
vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a
debilitating impact on security, national economic
security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters" (Congress, 2001 , 115
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processes , coordinating structures, and incident-related
actions required for the protection and restoration of
CI.KR [Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources]
assets, systems, networks, or functions within the
impacted area and outside the impacted area at the
local, regional, and national levels" (DHS, 2008, 6).
However, the concept of the need for dependable
infrastructure systems started well before the events of
9/11 . For example, Thissen and Herder assert that "the
functioning of modern society ... depends on the quality
of infrastructure facilities available" .. .and that "over
time infrastructures have become increasingly critical
to the functioning of society, as economic and social
processes to a large extent rely on the services provided
by such systems" (2003, I). Bringing the leaders of
government, academia, and industry together to discuss
current and future issues of critical importance and
how using science and technology can foster regional
economic development, the International Conference
on Technology, Policy, and Innovation used a theme of
Critical Infrastructure during the fifth conference that
was held in June 2001 at The Hague.
During this conference, as illustrated in the
subsequent publications, the conference established
that certain systems are critical to sustaining public
well-being in well-developed nations. Effectively
known
as
infrasystems,
transportation,
telecommunication and information systems, energy
systems, and water systems were recognized as critical
to sustain mm1mum operation of society and its
governments (Thissen & Herder, 2003). While the
conference in The Hague focused on a few
infrastructures, recent events have indicated that
critical infrastructures go beyond those outlined in
2001. For example, Harrington, Miller, and Wang
(2005) note that healthcare systems (i.e., hospitals,
ambulatory and nursing care facilities, insurance
companies, pharmaceutical manufactures, etc. ) heavily
contribute to the well-being of the society. Hence, the
list of infrastructure systems that are critical is not
limited to some official list of infrastructure; rather any
infrastructure system that has implications on public
health, economy, and security is critical.
The public's increasing dependency on certain
systems (e.g., agriculture and food, water systems
public health and safety, emergency services,
electricity, etc.) along with rapid institutional changes
(i.e., shifting from public to private, deregulation,
privatization, market driven economies, etc.) and
increasing technological changes have changed the
landscape of traditional infrastructure systems
(Gheorghe, 2006). Furthermore, increased demand for
quality services, coupled with tensions of profitability,
globalization, and trans-boundary dependencies have
had tremendous impact on operations of infrastructure
systems such that infrastructure systems are now

examination of themes commonly associated with Cl
research is established. Each established theme is
essential in understanding interconnectedness among
infrastructures. Third, the term interdependency is
explored in the context of dependable infrastructure
systems to illustrate that sustaining public well-being
requires dependable interdependent systems. In section
four, critical healthcare infrastructure (CHI) is used as
an
example
to
illustrate
complexity
and
interdependencies. The paper concludes with several
future research questions under consideration.

The Need for Dependable Infrastructures
While much has been written regarding Cls since 2000,
the concept of dependability has not been addressed
sufficiently. In infrastructure systems, dependability
means an infrastructure is performing normal,
especially when its services are needed. Revisiting the
CI definition, this suggests that the concept of
dependability and objectives of public health,
economy, and security are intrinsically related. For
example, whenever the destruction of a dependable
infrastructure occurs, severe impact to public
health/safety, economy or any combination of those
matters ensues. Consider the events that shocked the
world on September 11, 2001. Four planes were
hijacked from a dependable aviation sector leading to
over 2,500 deaths, over 6000 injured, loss of power and
water, closure of the New York Stock Exchange, all of
which affected the local as well as the international
economy and security (Kroger & Zio, 2011). Hence,
dependability of the aviation sector is linked to public
health, economy, and security. Following the same
logic, authors stipulate that for the inoperable
infrastructure systems to cause debilitating impact on
the public health, security and/or economy, the
infrastructure system must have the ability to weaken
people's way-oflife. Therefore, infrastructure systems
that the public heavily depends upon have this ability.
Identifying such infrastructure systems is an essential
element in making society more prepared for failures in
such systems.
From this perspective, the term
dependable is critical in advancing current dialog and
essential in future research.
For the most part, the drive for dependable
infrastructure systems has emerged out of shocking
events. For example, Fletcher (2002) and Moteff
(20 I 0) espouse that the events of 9/11 have had a
tremendous impact on infrastructure research and how
current society views certain systems. For example,
following 9/11, President Bush signed Executive Order
No. 13228 and 13231 in 2001, the U.S. Congress
passed USA Patriot Act of 2002 and established DHS
in 2002 to help sustain the public well-being via
protection and restoration of critical assets. Hence,
DHS sets the "concept of operations .. . approaches,
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intricately interconnected resulting in complex
infrastructures with intricate relationships. The old
structure of centralized electricity offered the
advantage of being simple and easy to coordinate, but
Gheorghe (2006), argues that this structure has been
transformed via liberalization and internationalization
(i.e., a decentralized control of systems across multiple
actors who are responsible for system performance).
Such changes
have
resulted in unforeseen
infrastructure dynamics that ensure that infrastructures
cannot be operated in isolation. The result is what
researches are refereeing to as a system- of-systems
whose function depends on the performance of
individual complex systems (Jovel & Jain, 2009;
Kroger & Zio, 2011). This stems from the realization
that a seemingly isolated infrastructure failure can
cause cascading failures because of interdependency
and could eventually cripple the whole infrastructure
system-of-systems.
By characterizing infrastructure as a system,
researchers are realizing that infrastructures are
comprised of "a set of elements so interconnected as to
aid in driving toward a defined goal" (Gibson, Scherer,
& Gibson, 2007, 2). Authors maintain that public wayof-life is a product of well-interconnected complex
systems that must work as an integrated system-ofsystems to fulfill objectives of the society. Following
the logic that infrastructure systems do not operate in
isolation, authors stipulate that infrastructure research
benefit from a careful examination of dependency,
exposure, interdependency, resiliency, risk, and
vulnerability all of which is necessary for the
understanding of the interplay that can exacerbate
consequences, hazards, risks, and threats in the
management of infrastructure systems.

Dependency. Dependency has two distinctive
meanings for CI research; first, it refers to a one-way
relationship that can exist between societal needs and
needs fulfillment by the outcomes offered by
infrastructure systems. For ex.ample, modern society
heavily depends on services provided by a healthcare
infrastructure. Second, dependency can also refer to
"the relationship between two products (infrastructures,
systems, or services] in which one product is required
for the generation of the other product" (Luiijf,
Nieuwenhuijs, & Klaver, 2008, 1). For example,
proper functioning of a hospital depends upon
availability of energy in its various forms (i.e.,
electricity, solar, and/or generators).
Hence,
dependency entails that proper functioning of
infrastructures is contingent on the availability of
products, goods, and services from other systems.
When a dependency relationship exists among
infrastructures, a new dynamic relationship is created
between CI. When the expected outcome is not
available, then the next infrastructure's outcomes are
interrupted and effectively cutting-off the line of
delivery. For example, daily hospital functioning
depends on the availability of electricity. On the other
hand, sustaining public well-being depends on the
availability of both infrastructure systems (e.g., energy
and healthcare sector).
This relationship creates
interdependence among infrastructure systems. Hence,
understanding dependency among infrastructures is
essential in discovering possible ways an isolated and
inane event can cause a cascading failure.
Exposure. Often associated with people's health,
exposure is usually related to concepts of dose amount,
pollution, toxicity, and surface area (Gheorghe, 2005).
It also entails the condition of being unprotected
especially from something severe (Merriam-Webster
Inc., 2006). In epidemiological studies, exposure
effects can be estimated based on concentrationresponse (Cao & Frey, 2011). Exposure suggests that
interconnected system and their outcomes (systems,
products, and services) are affected by system
openness since infrastructures do not operate in
isolation (i.e., they are in constant contact with other
infrastructures).
The constant contact with other
infrastructure systems ensures that there is a continuous
level
of exposure from
the interconnected
infrastructures. Exposure, whether planned or
unplanned, affects expected infrastructure outcomes.
Understanding the exposure relationship between
CI, the environment, and other systems is essential in
identifying ways of reducing negative influences on
system outputs.
Since Cls are interdependent,
unplanned exposure can affect the whole CI system via
connecting nodes (Kroger & Zio, 2011) . Moreover,
exposure also ensures that infrastructures produce what

Major Themes in CI
Successfully producing the desirable outcomes depends
on whether each system is dependable. Hence, in
designing infrastructure to be dependable, it is
necessary to understand relationships that can exist
among infrastructure systems. Expounding on the idea
of dependability, authors provide a synthesis of themes
commonly associated with concepts in CI research.
Such themes, authors argue, illustrate the importance of
understanding relationships among infrastructures in a
system-of-system setting where sustaining public wellbeing depends on intricate relationships among
multiple
integrated
infrastructure
systems.
Furthermore, authors stipulate that understanding
intricate relationships among infrastructure systems is
an essential step that should take place before the
development of infrastructure protection, mitigation,
and recovery measures since they enable the realization
of how risks and threats can permeate infrastructure
systems and cause cascading failures.
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modification of an existing system is based on pursuit
of opportunity" and that "Risk is always present in the
life cycle of systems ... " due to technical factors
(INCOSE, 201 l, 214). From the decision making
perspective, risk is associated with probabilities of
unknown outcomes and uncertainty (Gibson et al.,
2007). On the other hand, Blanchard (2008, 344)
defines risk as "the potential that something will go
wrong as a result of one or a series of events" while
Garvey (2009, 33) equates risk to "a probability event."
Gheorghe, Mock, and Kroger (2000) espouse that risk
should be perceived differently in different levels of
infrastructure systems. For example, addressing risk at
a nuclear power plant level is different from risk at a
regional and a societal level. The foregoing definitions
point to the fact the risk is that which happens without
one planning, anticipating, or intending the event.
Constantly under risk, infrastructures are exposed
to different extrinsic and intrinsic hazards, risks, and
threats via interconnectedness. Additionally, Cls are
always under threat from natural hazard events (e.g.,
flooding, severe heat, pandemics, etc.) and manmade
events
(e.g.,
sabotage
accidents,
etc.).
Interconnectedness among infrastructure almost
ensures that risk from one infrastructure will cause a
failure in interconnected systems. Hence, authors
espouse that risk should be addressed within
interdependency theme.

is needed for continued operability of infrastructure
products, goods, and services. However, it can also
influence the outcomes of an infrastructure in a
negative manner. For example, cyber systems ensure
interconnectivity between banking and government
but it can be a source of cyber threat to banking and
government (Dunn-Cavelty, 2007) . To understand
potential implications (i.e., causes, benefits, etc.) and
ways of managing exposure, the examination of the
types of interdependencies, relationship nodes, and the
infrastructure environment is essential.
Resiliency. A resilient system has the ability to recover
after deformation (Merriam-Webster Inc., 2006). In
engineering terms, it has been noted that resiliency can
be defined in terms of vulnerability and capacity.
According to Sauser, Mansouri, and Omer (2011, 3),
system resiliency "is considered to be a function of the
system's vulnerability, and adaptive capacity." In
Sauser et al., (2011, 3) it is suggested that "reducing
the system's susceptibility to shocks [extraneous
agents] reduces its vulnerability and consequently
improves its resilience" and therefore, "increasing the
system's adaptive capacity makes it [infrastructure]
more resilient." Since infrastructure do not operate in
isolation, Jack of resiliency in one infrastructure can
cripple the whole system. Hence, authors espouse that
resiliency
is
also
related
to
infrastructure
interdependency. The ability of the infrastructure to
bounce back after a negative event and return to the
normal operations is related to the number of
interdependent systems.
Infrastructure resiliency is an important concept in
CI because of two major factors: first, if Cls are unable
to recover and return to normal operations, the
debilitating impacts become severe by affecting other
interdependent systems. For example, the California
Electricity Crisis in which the state suffered large-scale
blackouts, collapse of several companies, and eventual
political turmoil (Sweeney, 2002) provides an
exemplary model. Second, making one infrastructure
resilient does not translate into resiliency of the whole
infrastructure system-of-systems. Moreover, resiliency
is necessary at the metasystem level because the
provision of public health, economy, and security are
only possible when infrastructure systems operate as a
unit despite natural and manmade events (i.e., hazards,
risks, threats, etc.). Therefore, authors stipulate that
studying resiliency in terms of infrastructure
interdependency is essential in making the whole
infrastructure resilient.

Vulnerability. Infrastructure that is vulnerable is open
to and capable of being physically damaged (MerriamWebster Inc., 2006).
However, since not all
infrastructures are physical in nature the qualifier of
physical damage is spurious in the CI research. Aven
(2011, 515) offers a slightly differing definition where
"[v]ulnerability is defined as the manifestation of the
inherent states of the system that can be subjected to a
natural hazard or be exploited to adversely affect that
system." On the other hand, The International Risk
Governance Council (IRGC, 2007) stipulates that
vulnerability of infrastructures is a viable area of
research especially for coupled infrastructures because
of mutual interdependences that exists among
infrastructure systems. Pointing to electricity usage as
an example, the IRGC notes that the smooth
functioning of other infrastructures (i.e., rail,
communications, etc.) heavily depends on availability
of electricity. This could present as a major source of
vulnerability of systems that depend on electricity.
Based in the preceding notes, authors contend that
vulnerability is an inherent characteristic of
infrastructure systems and is related to infrastructure
openness.
The whole infrastructure becomes vulnerable if
one independent infrastructure is open to and capable
of being damaged. This is especially the case for CI,

Risk. There is no one widely accepted definition of
risk. The term risk has been widely debated in
literature for years (Holton, 2004; Knight, 1921). The
INCOSE handbook notes that "every new system or
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since we have established that infrastructure systems
do not operate in isolation. Several past examples have
illustrated how vulnerability of one infrastructure can
affect other facets of health, economy, and security
(Gheorghe, 2006; Kroger & Zio, 2011). Authors
espouse that defining vulnerability as inherent opens of
infrastructures,
then
understanding
structural
interconnections
and
enhancing
infrastructures
structural integrity to prevent damage is paramount.
The concept of interdependency is also essential in
infrastructure vulnerability since protection, mitigation,
and recovery measures depend on knowing the
vulnerabilities of infrastructure systems and their parts
within the whole system-of-systems interdependent
infrastructures. Especially chosen to illustrate inherent
complexity in maintaining and sustaining infrastructure
systems, these themes indicate the need to understand
intricate infrastructure relationships.

relationship among infrastructures is not one-to-one
rather it is multidirectional. In the multidirectional
relationship concepts of risk, dependency, exposure,
resiliency etc. take on a new meaning beyond their
traditional formulations (Garvey & Pinto, 2009).
Emerging concerns regarding infrastructure
interdependencies have been echoed by leading
organizations including the European Commission
(EC) and DHS. For example, EC (2004) notes that
dependency on common technological advances such
as the internet, space-based radio-navigation, and
communication systems have made infrastructures
more interdependent forming a system-of-systems. The
same report notes that interdependency among
infrastructures have created new risks and
vulnerabilities effecting public well-being, security,
and economic prosperity. Preliminary research into
infrastructure
interdependencies
suggests
that
understanding how outputs of infrastructure affect the
operability of other infrastructure systems can be useful
in developing prevention, mitigation and recovery
measures. For example, the U.S. Technical Support
Working Group based at Idaho National Laboratory
stipulates that knowledge regarding enhancing
infrastructure protection is limited because of a lack of
understanding of the complex relationships that exist
among Cis.
In the analysis of infrastructure
inoperability and operability, a good starting point
includes initiating events and how events travel from
one infrastructure to another.
Authors contend that interdependency enables the
realization that the protection of infrastructure systems
cannot be developed in isolation.
For example,
Kandiah & Rao (2008) have demonstrated that water
infrastructures cannot be protected in isolation
primarily because to interdependencies that exist
between water systems, supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) systems, storage, transport,
power, and regulatory agencies. Contributing to
interdependency argument is the seminal work of
Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly (2001) where
interdependency is categorized into four types (i.e.,
physical, cyber, geographical, and logical).
As
research is directed towards interdependency, there is a
realization that this discipline is lacking tools for
management. There is a call for visual and interactive
tools capable of observing cascading events and their
consequences (Dudenhoeffer, Permann, & Manic,
2006).

Interdependency in Dependable Infrastructures
It is well established that hazards, risks, and threats to
infrastructure systems and their missions can stem from
natural phenomena and/or manmade activities. For
example, biological attacks such as smallpox, 9/1 I
attacks, oil spills, and numerous cyber threats are a
results of manmade events. On the other hand, the
2004 tsunami in South Asia, Hurricane Katrina, etc. are
natural events. Manmade hazards, risks, and threats
can be in the form of cyber and physical whose agents
often include hostile nations , bandits and criminals, and
insiders. Such threats often target soft points-ofweakness in infrastructure systems with debilitating
effects on national, state, and/or regional operations
(Gheorghe, 2006). Hence, increasing infrastructure
reliability, resiliency, and decreasing vulnerability, can
significantly aid in maintaining and sustaining public
well-being.
Authors espouse that using the concept of
interdependency is one of the ways infrastructure
operators/owners, policymakers, and researchers can
ensure the design, management, and operation of
dependable infrastructure systems.
The MerriamWebster Encyclopedic Dictionary (2006) notes that the
term interdependency is a combination of two
distinctive words; inter and dependency. The prefix
inter has meaning related to among, between, within,
and shared. On the other hand, dependency means
being influenced, determined by, conditioned by, or
subject to another for support. From the CI perspective,
interdependency
means
operability
of
one
infrastructure system is contingent on the operability
and outcomes of another interconnected infrastructure
system. Working on the assumption that the goal of
maintaining and sustaining public health, economy,
and security depends on the inputs and outputs of
multiple well-interconnected infrastructure systems, the
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Physical
interdependency

Cyber
interdependency

Geographical
interdependency

Logical
interdependency

etc.) and involved in physical and mental impairments,
diagnosis, treatment, prevention of disease, illness, and
injury in humans (White & Griffith, 2010). In terms of
infrastructure systems, the healthcare sector and its
constituent systems are charged v.~th alleviating natural
hazards, risks, and threats that affect public well-being
(e.g., hurricanes, extreme heat, earthquakes) and
manmade incidents (e.g., bioterrorism) (Harrington et
al., 2005).
Authors contend that the healthcare sector does not
operate in isolation. It is interconnected to water,
energy, transportation, baking and finance, and
agriculture. Hence, a seemingly remote interdependent
infrastructure can have a significant effect on
healthcare operations. The analysis of CHI, authors
espouse, should consider interdependencies because
they can offer insights into possible sources of risks,
potential dependencies, exposure levels, resiliency,
vulnerability etc. at the metasystem level. In this
section, authors examine intricate complexities and
interdependencies
of
managing
healthcare
infrastructure systems from the CI perspective.

Exists between infrasoucture systems if the
state of infrasoucture depends on the outputs
(i.e., product, goods, and services) of another
infrastructure. In Rinaldi, et al., (2001, 15), it is
demonstrated that the physical interdependency
in infrastructures "arises from the physical
linkage between the inputs and outputs of two
agents [where the] commodity produced or
modified by one infrastructure (an output) is
required by another infrastructure for it to
operate (an input)."
Exists among infrastructure systems if the
functioning of an infrastructure and its
components depends on the output that is
transmitted
via
information
and
telecommunication systems. Rinaldi (2004, 2)
notes that "computerization and automation of
modem infrastructures and widespread use of
SCADA systems have led to pervasive cyber
interdependencies."
Exists among infrastructure systems if
infrastructure systems share same environment
(DiSera & Brooks, 2009).
Sometimes a
common environment is needed in the coupling
of infrastructure and components; however this
poses a threat to all interdependent
infrastructure systems in case of failure
stemming from explosion.
According to Rinaldi (2004, 2) logical
interdependency exists in infrastructures "if the
state of each [infrastructure] depends upon the
state of the other [infrastructureJ via some
mechanism that is not a physical, cyber, or
geographic connection." A good example is
regulatory stipulations that linked the California
power crisis and financial infrastructure
(Sweeney, 2002).

Complexity and Interdependency. The availability of
any given healthcare system depends upon a variety of
system components and other interdependent
infrastructure systems that must work as an integrated
whole. According to Davidson (2010), healthcare
system
components
include
the
workforce,
environment, and facilities and their interactions. For
example, the workforce (i.e., physicians, etc.) interacts
with the environment for
provisions (e.g.,
transportation of pharmaceuticals). In addition, tools
and equipment are essential during diagnosis,
treatment, observation, and prevention of disease and
other health related issues. Furthermore, physicians
use facilities (e.g., hospitals) during treatment and
diagnosis procedures. Hence, meeting patient care
requires coordination of workforce, the environment,
and facilities.
Additionally, monitoring and improving public
health requires understanding intricate relationships
among infrastructure systems beyond immediate
healthcare systems. For example, Sypek, Clugston,
and Phillips (2008) demonstrate that providing
healthcare requires understanding global relationships
of culture and people.
Furthermore, healthcare
operations are heavily interrelated to other CI systems.
For example, Macaulay (2008) demonstrates that
within just eight hours of an incident, one is able to
detect the effects of food, safety, and government
sectors via a cascade of events. Authors offer the
following definition of CHI: a system-of-systems
comprised of multiple physical and/or virtual systems
vital to maintaining, sustaining, and improving public

With increasing technological, institutional
changes, increasing complexity, and increasing transboundary relationships, current society cannot analyse
infrastructure systems in isolation (Thissen & Herder,
2003). Despite being operational and managerially
independent systems which are geographically
distributed, CI must be governed as a whole primarily
because of the interdependencies that exist among
them. In fact, several researchers are currently calling
for a system-of-systems approach to deal with
problems in this domain (Haimes, 2008).
The
expectation is that maintaining, sustaining, and
improving the well-being of the public does not belong
to one system.
Hence, the design, redesign,
deployment, operation, and transformation of CI
requires holistic view of infrastructure systems.

Critical Healthcare Sector
The aim of this section is to describe interdependencies
in the healthcare sector. By healthcare, authors refer to
the sector charged with providing direct care (e.g.,
chiropractic, dentistry, medicine nursing, pharmacy,
insurance coverage providers, etc.) and indirect care
(e.g., institutional research, regulation, transportation,
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health whose failure can cause severe impact to public
well-being.
Healthcare can also be considered a system-ofsystems since it produces emergent system behaviors.
Emergent system behavior is a result of the interactions
of multiple complex interdependent systems that must
work as an integrated unit whole. Emergent behavior
are also a result of lack of communications among
infrastructure owners who include private competing
entities that do not share information (Chertoff, 2009).
Additionally, emergent behavior develop because of
interactions between numerous systems, unstable
environmental conditions, cultural issues, technological
advances, policy, and politics (Keating, Padilla, &
Adams, 2008). In the CI context, emergent behavior
asserts the need to know input and output flows and the
potential relationships they create.
While healthcare infrastructure worldviews may
vary from nation to nation or region to region, in this
paper authors have attempted to explore the
commonalities that unite different healthcare
worldviews. These commonalities include being able
to provide access (Penchansky & Thomas, I 981) and
diagnose and treat patients (Jonas, Goldsteen, &
Goldsteen, 2007).
Additionally, Davidson (2010)
stipulates that first care contact, longitudinality,
comprehensiveness, and coordination/integration are
essential in healthcare services. However, meeting
such objectives requires integration of numerous wellinterconnected complex systems that must work toward
the defined goal of public well-being. To illustrate,
authors use an example of the U.S. healthcare system
(USHS)
to
illustrate
complexities
and
interdependencies. The USHS is used as a case study
because many industrialized nations use a similar
healthcare structure (Jonas et al., 2007).
In describing USHS, Jonas et al., (2007) notes that
the healthcare system is comprised of five major
components including facilities, workforce, suppliers,
knowledge systems, and a finance component. Major
stakeholders include principal governmental health
authorities, other government agencies, private health
care sector, non-healthcare commercial enterprises, and
voluntary healthcare agencies. In addition, healthcare
oversight is required if different systems must work
together towards a common goal.
For example,
Frankel, Gandhi, and Bates (2003) note that improving
health (specifically, patient safety) requires systemwide changes with implications on cultural changes,
process changes, and measurement of health services.
The management component (i.e., administration,
planning, regulations, and evaluation) provides the
oversight along the lines of quality of healthcare
provision, equity achieved, efficiency, first care contact
services, longitudinality, comprehensiveness, and
coordination (Davidson, 201 O; Jonas et al., 2007).
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Working under the assumption that the "focus of
health care is to restore or prevent exacerbation of
health problems" (Jonas et al., 2007, 6) then, one has to
take into account all systems that enable the realization
of restoring or preventing the exacerbation of healthrelated problems. As discussed earlier, technological
changes, institutional changes, increasing complexity,
growing trans-boundary dependencies, and the demand
for higher quality products, goods, and services have
changed the structure of infrastructures creating
structural complexity (Gheorghe, Masera, & Voeller,
20 IO; Goertzel, 1992).
Additionally, increased
concerns regarding extraneous agents (i.e., hostile
nations, criminals, bandits, insiders, etc.) who seek to
disrupt public well-being by attacking soft-targets in
healthcare make the design and management of such
infrastructure
systems
paramount.
Exhibit
2
exemplifies some of CI themes in healthcare. As
previously illustrated, these themes are better
understood from the interdependency perspective.
Exhibit 2. CI themes in healthcare
CJ Theme
Dependency

Exposure

Resiliency

Risk

Vulnerability

Healthcare Implications
Daily hospital activities depend on the availability
of energy (i.e., electricity) and other infrastructure
system outputs
Healthcare infrastructures exposed to natural and
cyber threats via ubiquitous computing and
telecommunications
Healthcare systems must be able quickly bounce
back from effects of natural events (e.g., power
outage due to storms) and manmade events
Healthcare systems operate under multitudes of
risks including data breach, fraud and theft,
compliance and meeting regulations. They also have
to contend with increasing societal changes
Healthcare systems operate in the open and are
therefore capable of being damaged by physical
harm (e.g., explosions) and cyber attacks

Authors contend that understanding types of
infrastructure interdependencies can heavily contribute
to designing safer, reliable, and dependable
infrastructure systems.
For example, healthcare
geographical interdependency offers infrastructure
owners and policymakers an opportunity to design for
better health access, diagnosis, treatment, and patient
safety by being able to identify optimal healthcare
facility locations to minimize potential failure from
cascading events.
Similarly, identifying physical,
cyber, logical, policy, and societal infrastructure
interdependencies are essential since healthcare
systems do not operate in isolation. Hence, authors
contend that it is to the advantage of healthcare
infrastructure operators/owners, policymakers, and
researchers to know interdependencies among
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infrastructure systems. The identified themes do not
occur in isolation.
Additionally, knowledge regarding intricate
relationships among elements is necessary. Knowledge
regarding health facilities, workforce, suppliers,
knowledge systems, and finance systems and their
relationship contributes understanding structure
complexity.
For example, by understanding the
intricate relationships among the 4 million
professionals who operate over 6,600 hospitals with
over 492,000 ambulatory healthcare, healthcare
infrastructure
system
operators/owner
and
policymakers are able to identify soft targets, identify
critical services, and
effectively respond to
emergencies, disasters, risks, and threats (Harrington et
al. , 2005).
Clearly, seemingly isolated events can influence
the operations of a critical infrastructure. Of greater
concern is the fact that seemingly isolated events
cascade and cause massive failures . Rather than
reacting to crises that can arise due to complexities and
interdependencies, Calida and Katina (2012) suggest
early
participation
from
infrastructure
operators/owners, policymakers, and academia to
detect slow and evolving hazards, risks, and threats.
Such efforts contribute to the:
• Identification
of
dependencies
and
interdependencies among infrastructure systems
• Understanding of exposure rates and their influence
on interconnected infrastructures
• Determination of likelihood of infrastructure failure
due to internal and external factors
• Understanding of the infrastructure's ability to
withstand extraneous agents' influences
• Identification of infrastructure reliability, resilience,
and vulnerability and possible means of their
improvement; and the
• Identification of potential risks, how such risks can
affect public health/safety (consequences), and
ways to mitigate risks

holistically because infrastructure systems do not
operate in isolation. Hence, the underlying message of
this paper is a call for: 1) increased understanding of
structural complexity stemming from numerous
interactions among infrastructure systems and 2)
development of methods and tools capable of
holistically analyzing infrastructure systems. To this
end, authors propose the following questions to aid in
this dialog:
1. What are the methods, tools, and techniques
holistically analyzing infrastructure structural
complexity?
2. How can systems engineers holistically quantify
infrastructure susceptibility, reliability, resiliency,
risk, etc. in system-of-systems setting?
3. How does the intricate interaction among
infrastructure systems influence protection,
mitigation, and recovery measures?
4. What are the implications of having multiple
infrastructure interdependencies on resources
allocation?
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